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UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL UNIONS 
AND OTHER MARRIAGE ALTERNATIVES 
JOHN G. CULHANE* 
HE Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor1 was a 
victory for the LGBT rights movement and a vindication of basic 
principles of dignity and equality.  The Court ruled that Section 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage as the union of a 
man and a woman for purposes of federal law,2 betrayed the Constitution’s 
promise of liberty, as expressed through the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.3 
For Justice Kennedy, who authored the majority opinion, congressional 
zeal for excluding legitimately married same-sex couples from the federal 
benefits and responsibilities attendant to marriage could only be explained by 
animus toward these couples.4  For evidence of such animus, the Court looked 
no further than the many anti-gay statements that found their way into the 
Congressional Record and the House Report of DOMA.5  That Congress cut so 
deeply into the definition of marriage otherwise left to the individual states, just 
to exclude same-sex couples, was further proof of the true purpose behind 
DOMA. 
While Windsor is inarguably a watershed case, the Court’s destruction of 
DOMA creates complexities that will need to be worked out over the next 
 
 *  Professor of Law and Director, Health Law Institute, Widener University School of 
Law.  Contributing writer, SLATE MAGAZINE.  Blogger, HUFFINGTON POST.  Email: 
jgculhane@widener.edu.  Thanks to Megan Lagreca for inviting me to participate in this 
lively exchange of views on the possible implications of United States v. Windsor. 
1.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
2.  See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.  
Id. 
3.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692–96. 
4.  See id. at 2694.  “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned 
marriages and make them unequal.  The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for 
other reasons like governmental efficiency.”  Id. 
5.  See id. at 2693. 
The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference 
with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in 
the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the 
federal statute.  It was its essence.  The House Report announced its conclusion that 
“it is both appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the 
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage. . . .  H.R. 3396 is appropriately 
entitled the ‘Defense of Marriage Act.’  The effort to redefine ‘marriage’ to extend 
to homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the 
institution of marriage.” 
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12–13 (1996)). 
T 
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several years.  The patchwork of state laws relating to the recognition of same-
sex unions led to confusion and inconsistency even when the federal law was 
uniform,6 but sorting out whether federal laws relating to marriage will apply to 
same-sex couples is bound to increase the messiness of the problem, if only in 
the short-term.  Some laws, such as the immigration law that allows one 
member of a married couple to sponsor his or her spouse into the country, will 
be immediately advantageous to all legally wed same-sex couples.7  Yet many 
others may not be.  The situation is evolving, but it is still the case that if a 
same-sex couple living in, say, Pennsylvania, travels to New York or Delaware 
to marry, as of now there are at least some federal benefits for which they will 
not be eligible, such as spousal status under the Family and Medical Leave Act.  
That’s because Pennsylvania has its very own law “defending” marriage against 
same-sex couples.8  Perhaps same-sex couples and their allies in non-
recognition states will gain momentum toward marriage equality by pointing 
out the absurdity of this situation. 
Whatever the situation with the move toward full marriage equality, it 
seems likely that the civil union compromise is on the way out.  Inasmuch as 
civil unions are not marriage (even though they confer all the state law benefits 
of that status), it is becoming clear that couples in civil unions will not accede to 
the federal benefits of marriage, even with DOMA gone.  But is the demise of 
the civil union inevitable?  And should civil unions go the way of other larval 
states—useful for a time, but ultimately discarded in favor of a more mature 
status? 
In this essay, I explore the possible futures of civil unions and argue that 
the civil union has utility beyond its original goal of providing a kind of way-
station for committed same-sex couples in the drive toward marriage equality, 
in part because events over the past couple years have transformed the civil 
union into something more exciting.  Really. 
I. A FEW WORDS ON THE ORIGIN AND EXPANSION OF THE CIVIL UNION 
Civil unions are still young, first recognized by the state of Vermont in 
2000.  They were created in direct response to the decision by the Vermont 
 
6.  One particularly thorny issue has been whether a validly married same-sex couple 
can obtain a divorce in a state that does not recognize their marriage.  Often, the answer has 
been “no,” leading to a complex and unresolved situation for many such couples.  For a 
discussion of some of the state law proceedings, see John Culhane, The Paradox of Gay Legal 
Unions, WORDINEDGEWISE (Apr. 29, 2010), http://wordinedgewise.org/?p=13784.  
7.  See Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgne
xtchannel=e7801c2c9be44210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextoid=4579215c310af3
10VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD.  
8.  See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2013) (excluding same-sex couples from marriage); 
id. § 1704 (non-recognition of same-sex marriages from other states).  These laws are 
currently under challenge.  See generally Complaint, Whitewood v. Corbett, No. 1:13-CV-
01861 (M.D. Pa. filed July 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/1021/700/.  
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Supreme Court in Baker v. State,9 in which the court found the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage violated the state constitution’s guarantee of 
equality for all “Vermonters.”  But the court cannily left the remedy to the 
legislature, directing the lawmakers only to afford same-sex couples substantial 
equality, while leaving the name of the couples’ status to the democratic 
process.10  The resulting civil union, which purported to provide all the state-
based rights and responsibilities of marriage while pointedly withholding the 
label, was seen as either a shrewd compromise, or a capitulation.11 
The creation of the civil union added a valuable dimension to the marriage 
equality debate, by emphasizing the institution’s multiple purposes and 
meanings.  If marriage was only about the legal benefits, then the civil union 
would have been less problematic (although even in that case, it is hard to 
explain the desire to create a new name for marriage just for same-sex couples 
other than as an effort to confer second-class status on them).12  But marriage, 
of course, is much more than the sum total of its legal rights and obligations.  It 
is a deeply rooted social institution, membership in which conveys social 
commitment and communicates substantial expressive values.  In a way 
probably unanticipated at the time of its creation, the civil union served to 
highlight just how important marriage is to those seeking it.  And it isn’t 
marriage without the name. 
Despite limitations that were recognized almost from the start, civil unions 
gained traction in a number of states for eminently practical reasons.  In 
progressive states, civil unions (or the similar, but not always identical, 
domestic partnerships) were legislatively achievable even though marriage was 
not.  For many same-sex couples, the enormous practical value of legal 
equality—again, at the state level only—was better than nothing.  In particular, 
the disposition of property at divorce or death is much easier and clearer when 
the parties’ relationship is legally recognized. 
Further, many in the equality movement came to see civil unions as a 
cooling dish; a place to allow passions to dissipate while same-sex couples’ 
fellow citizens reached a measure of comfort with the idea that gay and lesbian 
families were remarkably similar to their own.  Full marriage equality, it came 
to be thought, would follow.  And in several states it has, with the time between 
 
9.  744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
10.  See id. at 886–88. 
11.  I was among those who saw it as a capitulation.  See John G. Culhane, A Tale of 
Two Concurrences: Same-Sex Marriage and Products Liability, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 447 (2001) (denouncing remedy).  But some saw the compromise as wise.  See generally 
Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15 
(2000) (applauding court and legislature’s actions).  
12.  See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008), vacated and remanded by 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  
[B]ecause of the historic disparagement of gay persons, the retention of a 
distinction in nomenclature by which the term “marriage” is withheld only from the 
family relationship of same-sex couples is all the more likely to cause the new 
parallel institution that has been established for same-sex couples to be considered 
a mark of second-class citizenship. 
Id. 
3
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civil unions and marriage shrinking to the point where Delaware moved from 
one to the other in less than two years’ time.  Connecticut, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont have also moved from civil unions to full marriage equality.  And the 
legal yo-yo in California—from an increasingly robust domestic partnership 
status, to full marriage equality, back to domestic partnership as a result of 
Proposition 8—has now come to rest, likely for good, on full marriage equality 
with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry.13 
Yet several states have gotten “stuck” at the civil union stage for different 
reasons.  In New Jersey, the legislature voted for full marriage equality to 
replace the civil unions that have been in place since 2006, but the measure was 
vetoed by Governor Chris Christie.14  A lower court judge recently ruled that 
civil unions are inadequate to confer the equality that New Jersey’s Supreme 
Court required in deciding Lewis v. Harris15 in 2006, but the Christie 
administration swiftly announced its intent to appeal, thereby keeping same-sex 
marriages on hold.16  Not until the state supreme court denied a motion to stay 
the issuance of marriage licenses in October 2013 did the governor give up the 
appeal. 
In Nevada, legal equality, or a “domestic partnership,” short of marriage is 
 
13.  133 S. Ct. 2562 (2013).  With Proposition 8 (Prop. 8), though, it seems that Yogi 
Berra’s maxim (“It ain’t over ‘til it’s over”) applies with special force.  Prop. 8’s proponents 
have filed a petition with the California Supreme Court, seeking a writ compelling the 
California county clerks to continue to comply with Prop. 8, on the ground that the federal 
district court’s decision bound only the parties to that litigation, and that state officials (the 
governor and the attorney general) lack authority to direct the clerks to issue marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples.  See Petition for Writ of Mandate & Request for Immediate Stay or 
Injunctive Relief, Hollingsworth v. O’Connell, No. S211990 (Cal. denied Aug. 14, 2013), 
available at 
http://gallery.mailchimp.com/cd3e28a2b5019008a4a05ecd9/files/2013.07.11_Petition_FINAL
_WITH_SIGNATURES.pdf. 
14.  See Kate Zernike, Christie Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion/christie-vetoes-gay-
marriage-bill.html. 
15.  908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
16.  See generally Garden State Equal. v. Dow, No. L-1729-11, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. Sept. 27, 2013).  According to a spokesman, Governor Christie, who had previously 
vetoed a marriage equality bill on the ground that the matter should be left to a statewide 
referendum, decided to let the state supreme court have the final word.  See Salvador Rizzo, 
“Historic” Ruling: Gay Marriage Ruled Legal in N.J., But Christie Vows Appeal, NJ.COM 
(Sept. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/09/gay_marriage_legal_in_nj_after_judges_histori
c_ruling_though_christie_vows_appeal.html.  Just days before this article’s publication, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling denying the state’s request for a stay of 
the ruling, and demanded that marriage licenses be issued as of October 21, 2013.  See 
generally Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 2013 WL 5687193 (N.J. Oct. 18, 2013).  Given the 
opinion’s strong denunciation of the civil union vis-à-vis marriage, it was clear that the court 
was going to find in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits.  See John Culhane, Marriage 
Equality at Hand in New Jersey, HUFF. POST (Oct. 18, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-culhane/marriage-equality-at-hand-in-new-
jersey_b_4124786.html.  The Christie Administration dropped its appeal on October 21.  See 
Chris Christie Administration Withdrawing Appeal of Gay Marriage Ruling in New Jersey, 
HUFF. POST (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/21/christie-gay-
marriage-appeal_n_4135867.html.  Thus, marriage equality has just come to New Jersey.  
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as far as the legislature can go on its own, because the state constitution 
expressly prohibits same-sex unions.17 
Similarly, the Illinois legislature recently tried, but failed, to move from 
civil unions to marriage.18  But the civil union in Illinois is part of a “boomlet” 
of state laws allowing opposite-sex couples to enter into civil unions, too.19  
And a small but steady stream of such couples has done so, eschewing marriage 
for this newer option.  Responding to a survey, opposite-sex couples in Illinois 
cited a variety of reasons for choosing these “virtual marriages”—a desire to 
express solidarity with same-sex couples for whom civil unions were the only 
option; the association of marriage with religion; and the historical connection 
between marriage and fixed gender roles.20  As one woman stated: “Gay 
marriage doesn’t seem like the right discussion to me.  Because it should be: 
‘What is this institution of marriage and does it still need to be defined the way 
it has been?’”21 
A few couples, though, chose civil unions as a way of gaining the state 
benefits of marriage while avoiding the consequences of remarrying and losing 
the federal benefits that they were currently enjoying.22  Obviously, such a 
decision relied on an interpretation of federal law that regards “civil unions” as 
different from “marriages.”  Although that reading appears sensible—no federal 
law refers to “civil unions”—at the time of this writing the status of civil unions 
for federal purposes has not been addressed in all contexts.  But from what we 
have learned thus far, it seems they will not be treated as marriages by federal 
agencies charged with distributing benefits and allocating responsibilities to 
married couples. 
II. THE UNCERTAIN EFFECT OF DOMA’S DEMISE ON SAME-SEX COUPLES IN 
CIVIL UNIONS 
A hint that civil unions might be seen as marriages came from a letter 
issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 2011 in which a Senior 
Technician Reviewer responded to a question about joint filing status from an 
H&R Block Tax Advisor by stating: 
In general, the status of individuals of the opposite sex living in a 
 
17.  See NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21; NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.010 (2013) (establishing 
domestic partnerships).   
18.  Trudy Ring, No Vote on Illinois Marriage, ADVOCATE (May 31, 2013), 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2013/05/31/breaking-no-vote-illinois-
marriage-equality. 
19.  Illinois, Hawaii, and Colorado allow opposite-sex couples to form civil unions.  For 
a summary of these laws, with citations, see Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statutes, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/civil-
unions-and-domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).  
20.  See John Culhane, No to Nuptials, SLATE MAG. (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/01/are_states_that_exper
iment_with_opposite_sex_civil_unions_offering_a_way_to_opt_out_of_oppressive_ideas_ab
out_marriage_.html.  
21.  Id. (quoting Leah Whitesel).  
22.  See id. (citing data from Cook County Clerk’s Office report).  
5
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relationship that the state would treat as husband and wife is, for 
Federal income tax purposes, that of husband and wife. . . .  
Accordingly, if Illinois treats the parties to an Illinois civil union who 
are of opposite sex as husband and wife, they are considered “husband 
and wife” for purposes of . . . the Internal Revenue Code, and are not 
precluded from filing jointly . . . .23 
If followed consistently, the IRS letter quoted above might have resolved a 
problem that I discussed in 2009: Once DOMA disappears, civil unions stand 
“revealed as weak substitutes for marriage” because there is no such thing as a 
“federal civil union[].”24  In effect, DOMA papered over a potentially 
enormous inequality between marriages and civil unions.  For example, a same-
sex couple married and living in Massachusetts can claim all federal benefits 
conferred on legal spouses, but a couple civilly united in Illinois might not be 
entitled to any such benefits.25  But if the federal government was willing to 
equate civil unions to marriages, as suggested by the IRS letter quoted above, 
that problem disappears. 
Whatever encouragement civilly united couples might have drawn from 
that letter (even though it was only a letter from one official in one federal 
agency, relating to one issue) was squelched by IRS Revenue Ruling 13-17.26  
The IRS ruling is best known for stating that same-sex married couples, no 
matter where they reside, will be treated as legal spouses for tax purposes, and 
may therefore file joint federal tax returns.27  Less noticed, though, was another 
statement in that ruling expressly denying marital status to those in civil 
unions.28 
Thus, at least one federal agency has already resolved the inherent 
ambiguity of the civil union in a way not favorable to couples in these 
relationships.  That’s not surprising, given that the status always carried 
ambiguity.  Consider the case of Illinois.  On the one hand, the legislators were 
specific and careful about conferring all the rights and benefits of marriage on 
couples in civil unions; on the other, Illinois law continues to define marriage as 
the union of one man and one woman.29  Courts that have found “marriage 
equivalents” inadequate have pointed out, with justification, that the civil union 
was created both to confer benefits and to make blindingly clear that same-sex 
unions were not “the real deal.”30 
For these reasons, the move from civil unions to full marriage equality has 
 
23.  I.R.S. Gen. Info. Ltr. coNEX-133350-11 (Aug. 30, 2011). 
24.  See John G. Culhane, Letters; Seeking the Right to Marry, and the Rights of 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07EEDF1F3DF935A15751C0A96F9C8B6
3.  
25.  For a fuller discussion of the current situation in New Jersey, see supra notes 14–
16 and accompanying text. 
26.  See Rev. Rul. 13-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.  
27.  See id. 
28.  See id.  
29.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/212(a)(5) (2013). 
30.  See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
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gained momentum from the demise of DOMA.  For now it is no longer possible 
to promise same-sex couples that their civil unions will be treated just the same 
as marriages.  Already, advocates in Illinois are pointing to the many federal 
benefits unavailable to gay and lesbian couples, and hoping that the now-
obvious inequity will be the final ingredient needed to push marriage equality 
over the top.31  And in New Jersey, the now-manifest inequality of that state’s 
civil union was the central reason for the recent decision by a trial court judge 
that continuing to deny same-sex couples the right to marry is 
unconstitutional.32  Per the court: 
[T]he State’s current system of classification assigns to same-sex 
couples a label distinct from marriage—a label that now directly 
affects the availability of federal marriage benefits to those couples.  
Following the Windsor decision [and its subsequent 
implementation] . . . .  [S]ame-sex civil union partners in New Jersey 
are ineligible for [those benefits].  The [civil union] therefore no 
longer provide[s] same-sex couples with equal . . . rights and 
benefits . . . , violating the mandate of Lewis and the [State] 
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.33 
At a minimum, it now seems that few, if any states, will be motivated to 
create new civil union laws, except in the unlikely event that it becomes clear 
they will be treated as equivalent to marriages under federal law, perhaps by the 
enactment of a federal civil union law.  But more than that, it is probably also a 
good bet that most of the civil union states will move in short order to marriage, 
and, in so doing, follow the lead of every state to have made that transition so 
far by doing away with civil unions, at least prospectively.34  The way-station 
will recede in the rear-view mirror, eventually disappearing. 
But this fate will not befall civil unions everywhere.  And their continued 
vitality in a few places should point the way toward a new and quite different 
role for them than as marriage consolation prizes. 
III. THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE STRAIGHT CIVIL UNION 
As noted above, Illinois, Hawaii, and Colorado offer the civil union option 
to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples.35  It is also noteworthy that, during 
the recent drive for marriage equality in Illinois, the proposed law did not seek 
 
31.  See Alex Keefe, Supreme Court Ruling “Bittersweet” for Illinois Civil-Union 
Couples, WBEZ91.5 (June 26, 2013), http://www.wbez.org/news/supreme-court-ruling-
%E2%80%98bittersweet%E2%80%99-illinois-civil-union-couples-107867.  
32.  See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, No. L-1729-11, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
Sept. 27, 2013).  Since then, full marriage equality has come to New Jersey.  See supra note 
16. 
33.  Id. at 50.  
34.  In some states, the law moving from civil unions to full marriage equality 
automatically converted all civil unions to marriages.  In other states, couples already in civil 
unions may remain in them, but no new civil unions can be formed.  
35.  See Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statutes, supra note 19. 
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to do away with civil unions, even for couples not currently in them.  Thus, 
once Illinois does allow same-sex couples to marry (which seems likely in the 
near future), all couples—gay, lesbian, and straight—will be able to choose 
between the two regimes.  Hawaii and Colorado can be expected to do the 
same, once they move in the same direction.  This is something new. 
This approach is meant to satisfy the opposite-sex couples who choose civil 
unions over marriage; of course, it will now also serve same-sex couples who 
wish to make the same choice.  Indeed, civil unions mean quite different things 
to same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples.  For most same-sex couples, they 
are (or were) a second-best, good enough to fight for, absent a realistic prospect 
of full equality, but decidedly not the goal.  But, as noted above, opposite-sex 
couples saw them quite differently: as a liberating alternative to an institution 
they wanted no part of.  An opposite-sex couple in a civil union would rightly 
be upset were their union involuntarily “converted” into a marriage.  After all, 
that isn’t what they wanted!  Consider the statement of Jennifer Tweeton, 
another civil union pioneer: “‘I feel like we don’t value the families that choose 
to be families without being married.  The civil union was a way to honor 
that . . . a way to demonstrate to others’ that these other family structures 
deserve respect, too.”36 
Tweeton’s statement is a fascinating point of entry into a much broader 
discussion about how the law defines—and thereby celebrates, or ignores—
human relations.  It is a close cousin to Professor Nancy Polikoff’s sustained 
and effective argument that the law needs to respond to the actual needs of its 
citizens, who live in many different forms of relationships.37  While Tweeton 
emphasizes the respect due these family structures, Polikoff’s focus is more 
practical.  But the two insights are complementary, because the law respects 
what it recognizes, and signals its value. 
Seen in this way, the civil union might be understood as a way-station of a 
different sort, or perhaps as a bridge to a broader range of legal (and therefore 
socially respected) options that would “value all families,” to use Polikoff’s 
felicitous phrase.  Seen as part of this wider transformative project, the civil 
union is powerful rhetorically, but not as significant legally.  As far as the law is 
concerned, it really is just marriage by a different name (assuming the federal 
benefits issues can be worked out). 
But in a society in which both straight and gay couples could choose 
between civil unions and marriages, civil unions might finally fulfill the 
promise that people like Greg Johnson saw for them more than a decade ago: 
Couples in a civil union are equal in all respects to couples in a 
marriage; yet at the same time the lesbian and gay community can 
retain and nurture a little of what is uniquely its own with the new 
institution. . . .  The lesbian and gay community is free to write the 
 
36.  See Culhane, supra note 20 (alteration in original).  Tweeton also noted that many 
members of her traditional Lutheran family did not regard her civil union with Alex Rifman as 
“real,” and that they had not come out about it to her 100-year old grandmother.  See id.  
37.  See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (Michael Bronski ed., 2008). 
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story of civil unions on its own without having to borrow every term 
and tradition from heterosexuals. . . .  The lesbian and gay community 
has the power, and perhaps even the responsibility, to turn civil unions 
into a vibrant, viable alternative to the institution of marriage.38 
This call for creativity struck me as naïve then, because it began from a 
faulty premise: even given the good faith of many Vermont legislators, the 
irreducible fact was that same-sex couples were pointedly walled off from 
marriage.  It is hard to see the creative potential in second-class citizenship.  
Now, though, Johnson’s insight is worth a serious second look. 
Consider this: in Delaware, the marriage equality law enacted earlier this 
year is converting all civil unions into marriages, involuntarily.  But now that 
equality has been achieved, what if a particular couple does not want their union 
converted?  Should they not have the option, just like the couples in Illinois, to 
retain their civil union status?  An acquaintance of mine, who is a Delaware 
resident in a same-sex relationship, expressed something close to anger over the 
new law, which gives him two unpalatable options: become married by 
operation of law, or actively dissolve his partnership.  What he wants, though, is 
to remain in the civil union.  (There might be an interesting lawsuit there, but 
that is the subject for a different article.)  Why should he and his partner—and 
all couples, straight or gay—not have that option?  If anything, Johnson’s 
insight might now turn out to have been too modest—perhaps not only same-
sex couples can be part of a transformative project. 
IV. POSSIBLE FUTURES—CIVIL UNIONS AND BEYOND 
With the demise of DOMA having unmasked the inadequacy of the civil 
union, it now seems quite unlikely that any state will create civil unions of any 
kind, but I hope for a different result.  Perhaps there is some chance that the 
“Illinois Experiment” will become a model for states to recognize this 
alternative to marriage for both same- and opposite-sex couples.  In any case, 
that should be only the start of a broader examination of what couples actually 
need (in every sense of that rich word).  The civil union is only a modest first 
step in the right direction. 
After all, civil unions available to all as an alternative to marriage are 
mostly symbolic.  Reasonable people can disagree about whether the 
importance of the messages they convey about autonomy, gender roles, and 
(perhaps) secularity outweigh the weakening of marriage (and its gently 
coercive function) that might occur from introducing a robust competitor.  
Especially to the extent that same-sex couples are allowed to join the marriage 
club, some of the straight couples that chose civil unions as an institution 
unmoored to marriage’s historical and societal associations might now rethink 
that position, and take the view that they can define marriage as they wish—
straight, gay, or queer; religious or secular; gender role defined, or defiant.  
Others, of course, will disagree. 
 
38.  Johnson, supra note 11, at 19–20. 
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But whether the civil union is on balance worth saving, the time is overdue 
for government policies and incentives that recognize the rich diversity of lives 
and relationships in which people are actually living.  As just two of many 
examples, the Family and Medical Leave Act might be expanded to grant time 
for people to care for their adult siblings, and financial and workplace support 
could be made legislatively available to caregivers who tend to their aged 
parents.  Targeted solutions addressing the particular issues that affect specific 
populations may commend themselves; so might more limited forms of 
relationship recognition, such as local domestic partnership ordinances offering 
a limited plate of benefits that might be sufficient for some. 
Broadly conceived as a push toward the full dignity and recognition of 
same-sex couples, the marriage equality movement has spun off some 
interesting legal relationships, including local and state-wide domestic 
partnership laws, federal laws, and judicial decisions that create a more 
expansive definition of “family,” and some intriguing foreign models, such as 
France’s pacte civil: a sort of “marriage lite” available to both same- and 
opposite-sex couples that has proven quite popular with young couples.39 
Although some see a subversive drive to end, or at least diminish marriage, 
in any call for more creative responses to the lives families are actually living, I 
do not agree with this zero-sum-game mentality.  There is no question that 
marriage is in crisis (with the flight from the institution having lately taken hold 
in the middle class),40 but a mature discussion about how the law might be 
more responsive to people’s needs could lead, in unexpected ways, to a 
reinvigoration of marriage as the best way for many people to secure for 
themselves the rights, protections—and dignity—they seek as part of a fully 
authentic life. 
 
 
39.  For a discussion of the effects of the pacte civil, see Effets du pacte civil de 
solidarité [Effects of the Civil Solidarity Pact], SERVICE-PUBLIC.FR [FRENCH CIVIL SERVICE] 
(July 1, 2013), http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F1026.xhtml (Fr.).  For an English 
translation of the pertinent section of the French Civil Code, see CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 
515-1 to 515-7, available at 
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/. . ./Code_22.pdf. 
40.  See The State of Our Unions: Marriage in America 2012, NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJ. 
& CTR. FOR MARRIAGE & FAM. (2012), available at http://stateofourunions.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2013). 
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